Are Factor Strategies Overcrowded by ETF Investors ?

17.February 2017

An interesting academic paper related to multiple equity factors:

Authors: Blitz

Title: Are Exchange-Traded Funds Harvesting Factor Premiums?

Link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2912287

Abstract:

Some exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are specifically designed for harvesting factor premiums, such as the size, value, momentum and low-volatility premiums. Other ETFs, however, may implicitly go against these factors. This paper analyzes the factor exposures of US equity ETFs and finds that, indeed, for each factor there are not only funds which offer a large positive exposure, but also funds which offer a large negative exposure towards that factor. On aggregate, all factor exposures turn out to be close to zero, and plain market exposure is all that remains. This finding argues against the notion that factor premiums are rapidly being arbitraged away by ETF investors, and also against the related concern that factor strategies are becoming ‘overcrowded trades’.

Notable quotations from the academic research paper:

"This paper investigates if factor premiums, such as the size, value, momentum and low-volatility premiums, are systematically being harvested by investors in exchange-traded funds (ETFs).

Using a comprehensive sample of US equity ETFs, this paper finds that there are many funds which offer a large positive exposure to target factors such as size, value, momentum and low-volatility. At the same time, however, there are also many funds which offer a large negative exposure towards these factors. On aggregate, the exposures towards the size, value, momentum and low-volatility factors turn out to be very close to zero.

The take-away from these results is that despite a large variation in factor exposures across funds, the only thing that remains when everything is added up is plain market beta exposure. This finding argues against the notion that factor premiums are rapidly being arbitraged away by ETF investors.

It also argues against the related concern that factor strategies may have become ‘overcrowded trades’. Many investors are concerned about overcrowding of factor strategies, although the concept is not clearly defined. The general idea behind factor overcrowding is that so many investors are chasing the same factors that the long-term premiums associated with these factors disappear, that valuations of the stocks in factor portfolios increase, and that correlations among the stocks in factor portfolios increase as well, which might result in elevated crash risk. As, from a factor investing perspective, there seems to be just as much ETF money chasing stocks with the wrong factor characteristics as ETF money chasing stocks with the right factor characteristics, the ETF market does not seem to justify factor overcrowding concerns."


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Are Hedge Funds Betting Against Low-Volatility Stocks?

10.February 2017

A related paper to:

#7 – Volatility Effect in Stocks – Long-Only Version

Authors: Blitz

Title: Are Hedge Funds on the Other Side of the Low-Volatility Trade?

Link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2898034

Abstract:

The low-volatility anomaly is often attributed to limits to arbitrage, such as leverage, short-selling and benchmark constraints. One would therefore expect hedge funds, which are typically not hindered by these constraints, to be the smart money that is able to benefit from the anomaly. This paper finds that the return difference between low- and high-volatility stocks is indeed a highly significant explanatory factor for aggregate hedge fund returns, but with the opposite sign, i.e. hedge funds tend to bet not on, but against the low-volatility anomaly. This finding has several important implications. First, it implies that limits to arbitrage are not the key driver of the low-volatility anomaly. Second, it argues against the notion that the anomaly may be disappearing or may have turned into an ‘overcrowded’ trade. A final implication is that the return difference between low- and high-volatility stocks should be recognized as a key explanatory factor for hedge fund returns.

Notable quotations from the academic research paper:

"There is a vast amount of evidence that low-volatility and low-beta stocks earn higher returns than predicted by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Blitz, Falkenstein, and van Vliet (2014) provide an extensive overview of the various explanations for this phenomenon that have been proposed in various streams of literature. One of the most popular explanations is that the anomaly results from limits to arbitrage, such as leverage, short-selling and benchmark constraints.

Leverage, short-selling and benchmark constraints may indeed prevent a lot of investors from exploiting the low-volatility anomaly, but such limits to arbitrage are much less of a concern for hedge funds, as these funds tend to be characterized by an absolute return objective and ample flexibility to apply leverage and shorting. Based on the limits to arbitrage explanation one would therefore expect hedge funds to be the smart money that actively takes advantage of the opportunity provided by low-volatility stocks. This paper empirically tests this hypothesis by regressing aggregate hedge fund returns on the return difference between low- and high-volatility stocks.

The main finding is that the return difference between low- and high-volatility stocks is indeed a highly significant explanatory factor for aggregate hedge fund returns, but with the opposite sign, i.e. hedge funds do not bet on, but against the low-volatility anomaly. This argues against limits to arbitrage such as leverage, short-selling and benchmark constraints being the main explanation for the low-volatility anomaly. The finding that the multi-trillion hedge fund industry is not arbitraging but contributing to the low-volatility anomaly also argues against the popular notion that the anomaly is disappearing or becoming an ‘overcrowded’ trade. The findings in this paper also have implications for the hedge fund performance evaluation literature, as the return difference between low- and high-volatility stocks turns out to be a stronger explanatory factor for hedge fund returns than many previously documented factors."


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Value and Growth Stock Behavior During Market Declines

3.February 2017

A related paper to:

#26 – Value (Book-to-Market) Anomaly

Authors: Folkinshteyn, Meric, Meric

Title: Value and Growth Stock Price Behavior During Stock Market Declines

Link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2814956

Abstract:

Using data for five major stock market declines during the 1987-2008 period, this paper provides evidence that value stocks are generally less sensitive to major stock market declines than growth stocks, controlling for beta, firm size, and industry group. Further analysis using several hundred different significant market move events between 1980 and 2015 confirms the observation that value stocks tend to outperform both the market average and growth stocks during market declines. The implication for investment practitioners is that following a value strategy does not lead one to assume greater sensitivity to unfavorable market conditions.

Notable quotations from the academic research paper:

"We conduct our study using data for five major stock market declines during the 1987-2008 period and several hundred stock market declines during the 1980-2015 period. For our core analysis, we selected a representative sample of five of the largest consecutive days of market decline in the S&P 500 index.

We use a combination of three ratios: dividend to price (dividend yield), market to book, and earnings to price (earnings yield). We classify a stock as a 'growth stock' if it pays no dividends, has an above-median market to book ratio, and a below-median earnings yield. We classify a stock as a 'value stock' if it pays dividends, has a below-median market to book ratio, and an above-median earnings yield.

Our research makes several important contributions to the literature. We document a consistent pattern of lower than average sensitivity of value stocks to most stock market declines, in excess of that predicted by beta. We also document that growth stocks have a greater sensitivity to most major stock market declines. We find that the decline of 2008 was distinct from the other major stock market declines in our study, wherein equities across the value-growth continuum were evenly affected. Further analysis using several hundred different significant market move events between 1980 and 2015 confirms the observation that value stocks tend to outperform both the market average and growth stocks during stock market declines."


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Common Factor Structure in a Cross-Section of Stocks

26.January 2017

An amazing academic paper about multiple equity factor models and about the way how to pick the best one:

Authors: Cooper, Maio, Philip

Title: Multifactor Models and the APT: Evidence from a Broad Cross-Section of Stock Returns

Link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883765

Abstract:

We seek to describe the broad cross-section of average stock returns. We follow the APT literature and estimate the common factor structure among a large cross-section containing 278 decile portfolios (associated with 28 market anomalies). Our statistical model contains seven common factors (with an economic meaning) and prices well both the original portfolio returns and an efficient combination of these portfolios. This model clearly outperforms the empirical workhorses in the literature when it comes to pricing this broad cross-section. Augmenting the empirical models with new factor-mimicking portfolios, based on APT principles, significantly improves their performance.

Notable quotations from the academic research paper:

"The traditional workhorse in the empirical asset pricing literature the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993, 1996) (FF3 henceforth) fails to explain the new market anomalies. Moreover, the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) (C4) does a good job in capturing price momentum, but also struggles in terms of explaining some of the pro fitability- and investment-based anomalies. In response to this gap, we have witnessed the emergence of new multifactor models containing (diff erent versions of) investment and profi tability factors, in particular the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015, 2016b) (FF5) and the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015, 2016) (HXZ4). However, several dimensions of the broad cross-section of stock returns are still not explained by the new factor models. In particular, the five-factor model does not account for momentum (including industry momentum), while both of these models do not capture several profi tability and investment-based (in particular, several forms of accruals) anomalies.

Following such evidence, several questions naturally emerge in the empirical asset pricing literature: How many factors do we need, and what are these factors, to describe well the broad cross-section of stock returns? To which dimensions of the cross-section of stock returns are these factors more correlated? To what extent (and how) can we improve the current multifactor models proposed in the literature in order to achieve a better description of large-scale cross-sectional risk premia? This paper attempts at providing answers to these questions. In order to achieve this goal, we adopt the general framework of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT).

We follow part of the relatively small empirical APT literature in terms of estimating common stock return factors by applying asymptotical principal components analysis (APCA) to a large cross-section of stock returns. We employ a total of 28 anomalies or portfolio sorts for a total of 278 decile portfolios. The estimation results show that there are seven common factors that are statistically signi ficant over our sample period (1972 to 2013). These seven factors cumulatively explain around 91% of the cross-sectional variations in the 278 portfolio returns. The first common factor basically captures the average anomaly and thus resembles a market factor. The other six factors capture di fferent dimensions of the large cross-section of market anomalies. In particular, the second, third, and four factors are strongly correlated with value-growth, investment, profi tability, and momentum-based anomalies. This is consistent with the role of the seven-factor model in terms of describing well this cross-section of 278 equity portfolios. This statistical model is thus a benchmark for this speci fic cross-section of stock returns, against which the existent models are compared.

We conduct cross-sectional asset pricing tests of our APT model by using the 278 equity portfolios as testing assets. The results con firm that the seven-factor model explains about 60% of the cross-sectional variation in the risk premia associated with the 278 portfolios. Moreover, most factor risk price estimates are statistically signi ficant. Across categories of anomalies, the APT does a better job in pricing value-growth and intangibles, compared to the group of investment-based anomalies. Moreover, the model prices perfectly an efficient combination of the original portfolios as indicated by the GLS cross-sectional R2 estimates around 100%. This result confi rms that the statistical model is a successful APT.

Next, we compare our APT model to some of most popular multifactor models existent in the literature in terms of pricing the 278 portfolios. The models include the already mentioned FF3, C4, HXZ4, FF5, in addition to a restricted version of FF5 that excludes HML (FF4), and the four-factor model of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) (which includes a stock liquidity factor). The results show that only C4 and HXZ4 o ffer an economically signi ficant explanatory power for the broad cross-section of stock returns, while the fit of both FF5 and FF4 is quite small. Moreover, the performance of all the six empirical factor models clearly lags behind the fi t of the seven-factor APT, suggesting that these models have a large room for improvement in terms of describing large-scale cross-sectional risk premia.

In light of such evidence, we defi ne and estimate new empirical multifactor models to better describe the broad cross-section of anomalies. All these models contain seven factors, to be consistent with our benchmark APT, and represent augmented versions of C4, HXZ4, FF5, and FF4, the best performing empirical models. The new factors in each of these models represent factor-mimicking portfolios (spreads among extreme portfolio deciles) associated with selected anomalies. These anomalies are those for which the original factors in each model do a worse job in terms of describing the time-series variation in the corresponding decile portfolio returns. Thus, our criteria for selecting the new factors relies on the APT restriction that the risk factors should explain well the time-series variation in the returns of the testing assets. The results show that adding the new factors improves all four empirical models, and helps especially the performance of both FF5 and FF4 in terms of explaining the large cross-section of stock returns. Moreover, the augmented models do a very good job in explaining an efficient combination of the original portfolios, thus, showing that they represent valid APTs. Therefore, the performance of the augmented empirical models is quite similar to that of our benchmark APT. Overall, our results indicate that there is a signi ficant room for improving the existing empirical multifactor models in terms of explaining the large cross-section of stock returns in a way that is consistent with the APT."


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PutWrite vs. BuyWrite Index Differences

20.January 2017

A short but interesting academic paper about differences in a well-known CBOE PutWrite and BuyWrite Indexes:

Author: Israelov

Title: PutWrite versus BuyWrite: Yes, Put-Call Parity Holds Here Too

Link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2894610

Abstract:

The CBOE PutWrite Index has outperformed the BuyWrite Index by approximately 1.1 percent per year between 1986 and 2015. That is pretty impressive. But troubling. Yes – troubling – because the theory of put-call parity tells us that such outperformance should be almost impossible via a compelling no-arbitrage restriction. This paper explains the mystery of this outperformance, which has implications for portfolio construction.

Notable quotations from the academic research paper:

"Writing equity index covered calls is an effective approach to jointly earning the equity and volatility risk premium. So too is writing naked equity index put options. Which approach is better? Many investors compare the historical performance of the two approaches for the answer, potentially leading to the conclusion that put-writing is preferable to covered calls. On the surface, it appears that writing put options would be the preferred approach. The CBOE PutWrite Index (PUT) has outperformed the BuyWrite Index (BXM) by approximately 1.1 percent per year between 1986 and 2015. That is pretty impressive. But troubling. Yes – troubling – because the theory of put-call parity tells us that such outperformance should be almost impossible via a compelling no-arbitrage restriction.

The primary reason behind the performance difference in the PutWrite and BuyWrite Indices is due to a construction difference during just four hours per month. A quirky difference in their portfolio construction results in the PutWrite Index missing out on approximately four hours per month of S&P 500 Index return relative to the BuyWrite Index.

Each month on the morning of option expiration, both the BuyWrite’s call option and the PutWrite’s put option expire and settle at the same time at the Special Open Quotation (SOQ). At this time, option expiration fully divests the PutWrite Index of its equity exposure. Until it re-establishes a short put option position, it is a zero beta portfolio. In contrast, at the same time, the BuyWrite portfolio becomes a beta one portfolio with the expiration of its call option, because it is fully invested in the S&P 500 Index with no corresponding short call option position. It remains a beta one portfolio until it re-establishes its short call option position.

So, over this four-hour window, the BuyWrite Index is over-exposed to the S&P 500 relative to its longterm average exposure. Similarly, the PutWrite Index is under-exposed to the S&P 500 relative to its long-term average exposure.

As an example, on average, between 2004 and 2015, the S&P 500 Index was down 23 basis points on option expiration mornings. The equity returns over this four hour period 12 times per year suggests 2.7% of annual underperformance for the BuyWrite Index relative to the PutWrite Index. Adding back in the intercept (annualized) provides a combined effect of 2.0% of annualized expiration-date underperformance. This is very close to the 2.1% the BuyWrite Index underperformed the PutWrite Index over the same 2004 to 2015 period."


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Purifying Factor Premiums in Equity Markets

14.January 2017

An interesting academic paper related to a lot of seasonality strategies, but mainly to:

#7 – Volatility Effect in Stocks – Long-Only Version
#14 – Momentum Effect in Stocks
#26 – Value (Book-to-Market) Anomaly
#229 – Earnings Quality Factor

Authors: de Carvalho, Xiao, Soupe, Dugnolle

Title: Diversify and Purify Factor Premiums in Equity Markets

Link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2894171

Abstract:

In this paper we consider the question of how to improve the efficacy of strategies designed to capture factor premiums in equity markets and, in particular, from the value, quality, low risk and momentum factors. We consider a number of portfolio construction approaches designed to capture factor premiums with the appropriate levels of risk controls aiming at increasing information ratios. We show that information ratios can be increased by targeting constant volatility over time, hedging market beta and hedging exposures to the size factor, i.e. neutralizing biases in the market capitalization of stocks used in factor strategies. With regards to the neutralization of sector exposures, we find this to be of importance in particular for the value and low risk factors. Finally, we look at the added value of shorting stocks in factor strategies. We find that with few exceptions the contributions to performance from the short leg are inferior to those from the long leg. Thus, long-only strategies can be efficient alternatives to capture these factor premiums. Finally, we find that factor premiums tend to have fatter tails than what could be expected from a Gaussian distribution of returns, but that skewness is not significantly negative in most cases.

Notable quotations from the academic research paper:

"In this paper we show the importance of portfolio construction when it comes to capturing factor premiums efficiently. We first show that the simplest and most traditional approaches to factor investing tend to generate lower risk-adjusted returns because of uncontrolled risk and unwanted exposure to the market index or market capitalization biases. We show that strategies that target constant volatility and hedge the market beta and exposure to size deliver higher information ratios. This is in particular due to a reduction in volatility.

We also show the importance of removing sector exposure as an additional source of risk without return in factor investing. And we explain why long only factor investing can rather efficiently capture factor premiums, in particular from the low risk and momentum factors. Additionally, we demonstrate the importance of diversifying factors in each style thanks to the decorrelation of factor returns even within the same style.

Finally, we show that factor premiums tend to exhibit fat tails, but also a relatively small skewness.

Overall, we defend the importance of purifying and diversifying factor exposures in factor investing as one way of significantly improving risk-adjusted returns from factor strategies. And although this causes turnover to increase due to the need for additional trades, we highlight the fact that most of the benefits shown in this paper can be captured in practice by using clever approaches to contain turnover."


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Seasonalities in Stock Returns

8.January 2017

An interesting academic paper related to a lot of seasonality strategies, but mainly to:

#125 – 12 Month Cycle in Cross-Section of Stocks Returns

Authors: Hirschleifer, Jiang, Meng

Title: Mood Beta and Seasonalities in Stock Returns

Link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880257

Abstract:

Existing research has documented cross-sectional seasonality of stock returns – the periodic outperformance of certain stocks relative to others during the same calendar month, weekday, or pre-holiday periods. A model based on the differential sensitivity of stocks to investor mood explains these effects and implies a new set of seasonal patterns. We find that relative performance across stocks during positive mood periods (e.g., January, Friday, the best-return month realized in the year, the best-return day realized in a week, pre-holiday) tends to persist in future periods with congruent mood (e.g., January, Friday, pre-holiday), and to reverse in periods with non-congruent mood (e.g., October, Monday, post-holiday). Stocks with higher mood betas estimated during seasonal windows of strong moods (e.g., January/October, Monday/Friday, or pre-holidays) earn higher expected returns during future positive mood seasons but lower expected returns during future negative mood seasons.

Notable quotations from the academic research paper:

"We propose here a theory based on investor mood to offer an integrated explanation for known seasonalities at both the aggregate and cross-sectional levels, and to offer new empirical implications which we also test. In our model, investor positive (negative) mood swings cause periodic optimism (pessimism) in evaluating signals about assets’ systematic and idiosyncratic payoff components. This results in seasonal variation in mispricing and return predictability.

Consistent with the model predictions, we uncover a set of new cross-sectional return seasonalities based on the idea that stocks that have been highly sensitive to seasonal mood fluctuations in the past will also be sensitive in the future. In other words, we argue that some stocks have higher sensitivities to mood changes (higher mood betas) than others, which creates a linkage between mood-driven aggregate seasonalities and seasonalities in the cross-section of returns. In particular, we argue that investor mood varies systematically across calendar months, weekdays, and holidays. In consequence, a mood beta estimated using security returns in seasons with mood changes helps to predict future seasonal returns in other periods in which mood is expected to change.

During our sample period 1963-2015. the average stock excess return (measured by CRSP equal-weighted index return minus the riskfree rate) is highest in January and lowest in October. Thus, we focus on January as a proxy for an investor high-mood state and October for a low-mood state. Using Fama-MacBeth regressions, we verify the finding of Heston and Sadka (2008) for January and October—historical January (October) relative performance tends to persist in future January (October) for the following ten or more years. In our interpretation, stocks that do better than others during one month will tend to do better again in the same month in the future because there is a congruent mood at that time.

Furthermore, we find a new reversal effect that crosses months with incongruent moods; historical January (October) returns in the cross section tends to significantly reverse in subsequent Octobers (Januaries). A stock that did better than other stocks last January tends to do worse than other stocks in October for the next five years or so. A one-standard-deviation increase in the historical congruent (incongruent)-calendar-month leads an average 23% increase (17% decrease) in the next ten years, relative to the mean January/October returns.

Our explanation for these effects is not specific to the monthly frequency. A useful way to challenge our theory is therefore to test for comparable cross-sectional seasonalities at other frequencies. Moving to the domain of daily returns, we document a similar set of congruent/incongruent-mood-weekday return persistence and reversal effects.

We confirm this return persistence effect for Monday and Friday returns, and then show, analogous to the monthly results, that a congruent-mood-weekday return persistence effect applies: relative performance across stocks on the best-market-return (worst-market-return) day realized in a week tends to persist on subsequent ten Fridays (Mondays) and beyond, when good (bad) market performance is expected to continue. A one-standard-deviation increase in historical congruent-weekday or congruent-mood-weekday return is associated an average with a 4% or 12% higher return in the subsequent ten Mondays/Fridays.

At the level of individual stocks, there is pre-holiday cross-sectional seasonality, wherein stocks that historically have earned higher pre-holiday returns on average earn higher pre-holiday returns for the same holiday over the next ten years.

The cross-sectional return persistence and reversal effects across months, weekdays, and holidays are overall consistent with our theoretical predictions that investors’ seasonal mood fluctuations cause seasonal misperceptions about factor and firm-specific payoffs and lead to cross-sectional return seasonalities. These predictions are based on the idea that different stocks have different mood beta—a stock’s return sensitivity to factor mispricing induced by mood shocks. We argue that the concept of mood beta integrates various seasonality effects. We therefore perform more direct tests of the model prediction that mood betas will help forecast the relative performance of the stocks in seasons with different moods."


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An Effect of Monetary Conditions on Carry Trades

22.December 2016

A related paper to:

#5 – FX Carry Trade

Authors: Falconio

Title: Carry Trades and Monetary Conditions

Link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2854134

Abstract:

This paper investigates the relation between monetary conditions and the excess returns arising from an investment strategy that consists of borrowing low-interest rate currencies and investing in currencies with high interest rates, so-called "carry trade". The results indicate that carry trade average excess return, Sharpe ratio and 5% quantile differ substantially across expansive and restrictive conventional monetary policy before the onset of the recent financial crisis. By contrast, the considered parameters are not affected by unconventional monetary policy during the financial crisis.

Notable quotations from the academic research paper:

"My main result is that carry trade portfolio average return, Sharpe ratio and 5% quantile di ffer substantially across expansive and restrictive conventional monetary policy before the onset of the recent financial crisis. Speci fically, I find that expansive periods are characterised by signi cantly higher average returns and Sharpe ratios and lower downside risk. Concerning this, I argue that expansive conventional monetary policy is able to improve market expectations across countries and in this way lower FX volatility risk. This generates a currency appreciation for net debtor nations and an increase in carry trade pro fits.

Second, I present evidence suggesting that the considered parameters are similar across aggressive and stabilising unconventional monetary policy during the recent financial crisis. So, the Federal Reserve could not a ffect market expectations during this time.

For investors, this evidence suggests that rewards from carry trade vary with changes in monetary conditions only during "normal" times. For researchers, this evidence suggests that recognising the relevance of monetary policy is crucial to understanding the pricing implications of FX volatility risk for carry trade."


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An Interesting Analysis of Shiller’s CAPE Ratio

17.December 2016

An interesting new academic paper related to an actual issue – a high valuation of us equities:

Authors: Dimitrov, Jain

Title: Shiller's CAPE: Market Timing and Risk

Link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2876644

Abstract:

Robert Shiller shows that Cyclically Adjusted Price to Earnings Ratio (CAPE) is strongly associated with future long-term stock returns. This result has often been interpreted as evidence of market inefficiency. We present two findings that are contrary to such an interpretation. First, if markets are efficient, returns on average, even when conditional on CAPE, should be higher than the risk-free rate. We find that even when CAPE is in its ninth decile, future 10-year stock returns, on average, are higher than future returns on 10-year Treasurys. Thus, the results are largely consistent with market efficiency. Only when CAPE is very high, say, CAPE is in the upper half of the tenth decile (CAPE higher than 27.6), future 10-year stock returns, on average, are lower than those on 10-year U.S. Treasurys. Second, we provide a risk-based explanation for the association between CAPE and future stock returns. We find that CAPE and future stock returns are positively associated with future stock market volatility. Overall, CAPE levels do not seem to reflect market inefficiency and do reflect risk (volatility).

Notable quotations from the academic research paper:

"Among various market valuation indicators proposed over the history of the stock market, one of the most popular ones is Robert Shiller’s Cyclically Adjusted Price to Earnings Ratio (CAPE). CAPE is defined as the current price of the S&P 500 index divided by the S&P 500 index’s ten-year average inflation-adjusted earnings. John Campbell and Robert Shiller have analyzed the relationship between CAPE and future stock returns in a series of articles. They show that future 10-year stock returns on the S&P 500 index are negatively associated with CAPE. Shiller (1996, p. 2) concludes that “…the association seems so strong as to suggest that this relation is not consistent with the efficient markets or random walk model.” In contrast, proponents of market efficiency argue that this evidence is consistent with “rational swings in expected returns” (Fama). The debate continues unabated to this day and interest in understanding CAPE remains high.

In this paper, we present two sets of analyses to shed light on this ongoing debate on market efficiency. First, if markets are efficient, knowing CAPE should not help investors earn superior future returns by selling (buying) stocks and buying (selling) a risk-free asset when CAPE is high (low). In other words, market timing strategies using CAPE should not be profitable. However, we are not aware of any formal tests of such strategies. We find that with the exception of the periods when CAPE is in the upper half of its 10th decile (CAPE higher than 27.6), on average, it is not beneficial to time the market. For the most part, investors cannot profit from the evidence that CAPE is associated with future 10-year stock returns. Second, if markets are efficient, CAPE (and future stock market returns) should be associated with overall risk in the stock market. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the association between CAPE (and future stock market returns) and future stock return volatility (risk). We find that CAPE (and 10-year future stock returns) is associated with future 10-year volatility of stock returns. Thus, risk as measured by volatility seems to be a potential explanation for CAPE-based patterns in stock returns. Overall, the ability of CAPE to forecast future stock market returns appears consistent with a positive association between risk and returns. It does not seem to imply that markets are inefficient."


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Sources of Return for CTAs – A Brief Survey of Relevant Research

9.December 2016

A related paper has been added to:

#118 – Time Series Momentum Effect

Authors: Till

Title: What are the Sources of Return for CTAs and Commodity Indices? A Brief Survey of Relevant Research

Link: http://www.oxfordstrat.com/coasdfASD32/uploads/2016/03/Sources-of-Return-for-CTAs.pdf

Abstract:

This  survey  paper  will  discuss  the  (potential)  structural  sources  of  return  for  both  CTAs  and  commodity  indices  based  on  a  review  of  empirical  research  articles  from  both  academics  and  practitioners.  The  paper  specifically  covers  (a)  the  long-term  return  sources  for  both  managed  futures  programs  and  for  commodity  indices;  (b)  the  investor  expectations  and  the  portfolio  context for futures strategies; and (c) how to benchmark these strategies.

Notable quotations from the academic research paper:

"In the academic literature, one can find strong evidence – historically at least – for there being persistent returns in futures programs due to momentum, roll yield, and also due to rebalancing. This is actually the case across asset classes, and not just for commodity futures contracts.

The AQR authors theorised that “price trends exist in part due to long-standing behavioural biases exhibited by investors, such as anchoring and herding, as well as the trading activity of  non-profit seeking participants, such as  central banks and corporate hedging programs.” Assuming these factors continue, the long-term profitability from momentum strategies might also continue, and not just be a matter of history.

“However, the … strategy also exposed investors to large losses … during both [historical] periods,” noted the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago paper (Chabot et al. (2014)).  Interestingly,  “[m]omentum  …  [losses]  were [apparently]  predictable”.  In  both  historical  periods,  losses  were  “more  likely  when  momentum recently performed well.” For the 1867 to 1907 period, losses were more likely when “interest rates were relatively low.” And for the 1927 to 2012 period, losses were more likely when “momentum had recently outperformed the stock market”. Each of these periods were “times when borrowing or attracting return chasing  ‘blind  capital’  would  have been  easier.”  The authors argue that the periodic large losses, associated with the strategy plausibly becoming too popular, “play an important role in sustaining” the momentum strategy’s historical returns.

In  addition to momentum,  the empirical literature also documents that “roll yield” can be considered a structural source of return, at least over long periods of time. For example, Campbell & Company  (2013) described a proprietary trend-following benchmark, in which they calculated returns from 1972 through November 2012, and which included a selection of equity, fixed income, foreign exchange, and commodity markets. Over this 40-year period, approximately half of the benchmark’s cumulative performance was due to spot return, and the other half was due to roll yield. Over long horizons, the roll yield is important mainly for commodity futures contracts. This is because of another structural feature of commodity markets: mean reversion. If a commodity has a tendency over long enough timeframes to mean-revert, then by construction, returns cannot be due to a long-term appreciation (or depreciation) in spot prices. In that case, over  a  sufficient time frame, the futures-only return for a futures contract would have to basically collapse to its roll yield. Can we observe this historically in commodity futures markets? The  answer is essentially yes.

The mean-reversion of commodity prices can also have meaningful consequences for returns at the portfolio- or index-level. Specifically, this feature is at the root of an additional source of return, quite separate from trends in spot prices or the potential persistence of curve-structure effects. That potential additional source of return is the return from rebalancing. Erb and Harvey (2006) discussed how there can be meaningful returns from rebalancing a  portfolio of lowly-correlated, high-variance instruments. The rebalancing effect was explained Greer et al. (2014), as follows: “[A] ‘rebalancing return’ … can naturally accrue from periodically resetting a portfolio of assets back to its strategic weights, causing the investor to sell assets that have gone up in value and buy assets that have declined.”

One caveat is that one’s holding period may have to be quite long term in order for these return effects to be apparent. However, even structurally positive returns may be insufficient to motivate investors to consider futures products. A CTA (or global macro) investor may require that the program’s return profile is also long-options-like; and an institutional investor will expect that a commodity index will provide diversification for a stock-and-bond portfolio. The paper also noted that how these programs are benchmarked will depend on whether a futures program is considered a beta, an alternative beta, pure alpha, or well-timed beta. This paper correspondingly provided recommendations for benchmarks for each of these types of investment exposures."


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